search query: @journal_id 23 / total: 102
reference: 68 / 102
| Author: | Aumann, R. Branderburger, A. |
| Title: | Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1995 : SEP, VOL. 63:5, p. 1161-1180 |
| Index terms: | GAME THEORY RATIONALITY STRATEGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player will do. Common knowledge plays a smaller role in characterizing Nash equilibrium than had been supposed. |
SCIMA