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| Author: | Kim, Y. Sobel, J. |
| Title: | An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1995 : SEP, VOL. 63:5, p. 1181-1193 |
| Index terms: | COMMUNICATION GAME THEORY STRATEGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors add a round of pre-play communication to a finite two-player game played by a population of players. Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs. The paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process. Periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population. |
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