search query: @journal_id 23 / total: 102
reference: 64 / 102
| Author: | Cripps, M. Thomas, J. |
| Title: | Reputation and commitment in two-person repeated games without discounting |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1995 : NOV, VOL. 63:6, p. 1401-1420 |
| Index terms: | REPEATED GAMES ECONOMICS THEORIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the player. If there is a possibility that a player is an automation committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games. |
SCIMA