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| Author: | Vega-Redondo, F. |
| Title: | The evolution of Walrasian behaviour |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1997 : MARCH, VOL. 65:2, p. 375-384 |
| Index terms: | MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS PRICES GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The central hypothesis in Walrasian theory is that agents take prices parametrically. There has been provided some literature to provide some theoretical basis for this hypothesis. There is the approach grounded on cooperative game theory which revolves around the various equivalence theorems. The other approach has adopted the perspective of noncooperative game theory. In both game-theoretic frameworks a key condition for the support of Walrasian behaviour is the absence of monopoly power, agents must not have the power to affect prices. In this article an alternative basis is provided for Walrasian behaviour which avoids any considerations related to monopoly power or the related notion of a large enough population. |
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