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| Author: | Fehr, E. Gächter, S. Kirchsteiger, G. |
| Title: | Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1997 : JULY, VOL. 65:4, p. 833-860 |
| Index terms: | CONTRACTS AGENCY THEORY MORAL HAZARD |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study argues that reciprocal motivations have implications for the enforcement of contracts. Experiments are designed in which implications are observed. Two treatments are designed to isolate the impact of reciprocy on contract enforcement. In the weak reciprocy treatment only workers can respond reciprocally to companies' actions, and in the strong reciprocy treatment workers and companies can respond reciprocally to the other parties' actions. the neglect of reciprocity may render principal agent models incomplete, and this may limit their predictive power. |
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