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| Author: | Le Breton, M. Sen, A. |
| Title: | Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1999 : MAY, VOL. 67:3, p. 565-603 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMETRICS STRATEGY PREFERENCES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper considers strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. The paper provides several characterization results in the case where preferences are separable only with respect of elements of some partition of the sets of components and these partitions vary across individuals. |
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