search query: @indexterm TENDER OFFERS / total: 102
reference: 3 / 102
Author: | Louis, H. White, H. |
Title: | Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior |
Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2007 : JUL, VOL. 85:1, p. 205-233 |
Index terms: | financial reporting managers tender offers signaling auctions Netherlands |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | Using a firm's financial reporting behaviour to conclude managerial intent, there is found evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase (here as: rep./reps.) tender offers (as: t-offs.) to signal undervaluation (here as: u-v). However, in contrast there is found no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction (as: D-an.) t-offs. to signal u-v. Instead, firms engaging in D-an. reps. act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the reps. to further reduce the repurchasing price. |
SCIMA