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Author:Louis, H.
White, H.
Title:Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2007 : JUL, VOL. 85:1, p. 205-233
Index terms:financial reporting
managers
tender offers
signaling
auctions
Netherlands
Language:eng
Abstract:Using a firm's financial reporting behaviour to conclude managerial intent, there is found evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase (here as: rep./reps.) tender offers (as: t-offs.) to signal undervaluation (here as: u-v). However, in contrast there is found no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction (as: D-an.) t-offs. to signal u-v. Instead, firms engaging in D-an. reps. act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the reps. to further reduce the repurchasing price.
SCIMA record nr: 267830
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