search query: @author Franks, J. / total: 11
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| Author: | Franks, J. Mayer, C. |
| Title: | Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1996 : JAN, VOL. 40:1, p. 163-181 |
| Index terms: | MANAGEMENT MERGERS FINANCE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the disciplining function of hostile takeovers in the U.K. in 1985 and 1986. The authors report evidence of high board turnover and significant levels of post-takeover restructuring. Large gains are anticipated in hostile bids as reflected in high bid premiums. However, there is little evidence of poor performance prior to bids, suggesting that the high board turnover does not derive from past managerial failure. Hostile takeovers do not therefore perform a disciplining function. |
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