search query: @author Ofek, E. / total: 11
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| Author: | Berger, P. G. Ofek, E. Yermack, D. L. |
| Title: | Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
1997 : SEP, VOL. 52:4, p. 1411-1438 |
| Index terms: | MANAGERIAL ACTIVITIES COMPANY CONTROL CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF COMPANIES ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Associations between managerial entrenchment and companies' capital structures are studied in this paper, with results suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. It was found in a cross-sectional analysis that leverage levels are lower when CEOs don't face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. It was found that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements and the addition to the major stockholder board. |
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