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Author:Almazan, A.
Suarez, J.
Title:Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures
Journal:Journal of Finance
2003 : APR, VOl. 58:2. p. 519-547
Index terms:Chief executive officers
Compensation
Corporate governance
Severance payments
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his/her management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the CEO's compensation package and on the CEO's influence on the board of directors regarding hiw own replacement. The authors explain when and why the combination of some degree of entrechment and a sizeable severance package is desirable.
SCIMA record nr: 248779
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