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| Author: | Klaus, B. |
| Title: | Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
2001 : VOL.34:1, p64-82 |
| Index terms: | ALLOCATION MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors have studied two allocation models. In the first model, they consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, they study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Their main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictatorial components, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). Furhtermore, they study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy. |
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