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| Author: | Spagnolo, G. |
| Title: | Managerial incentives and collusive behavior |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
2005 : AUG, VOL. 49:6, p. 1501-1523 |
| Index terms: | corporate governance control executives compensation earnings cartels oligopoly models |
| Freeterms: | collusion |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives are characterized on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits, manager-led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors. Capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts' duration. |
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