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| Author: | Husted, B.W. |
| Title: | Agency, information, and the structure of moral problems in business |
| Journal: | Organization Studies
2007 : FEB, VOL. 28:2, p. 177-195 |
| Index terms: | agency theory incentives information ethics moral hazard models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes ethical problems (hereafter as: prbls.) using information economics and the principal-agent model/s (here as: p-a-m. / p-a-ms.), defining the nature of moral prbls. in business. Then, p-a-ms. involving adverse selection and moral hazard are applied to these prbls. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined to support the development of organizational virtue. |
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