search query: @indexterm AUDITING / total: 1120
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| Author: | Macho-Stadler, I. Pérez-Castrillo, D. |
| Title: | Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2006 : JAN, VOL. 51:1, p. 110-131 |
| Index terms: | auditing environment taxation |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, this paper studies the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. It is shown that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution less. Additionally, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply: but all of them evade the environmental taxes. |
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