search query: @indexterm supervision / total: 119
reference: 19 / 119
| Author: | Faure-Grimaud, A. Laffont, J.-J. Martimort, D. |
| Title: | Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft information |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
2003 : VOL. 70:2(243), p. 253-279 |
| Index terms: | Economic theory Asymmetric information Organizational research Supervision |
| Freeterms: | Equivalence principle |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. The authors consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. |
SCIMA