search query: @indexterm Supervision / total: 119
reference: 12 / 119
Author: | Burhop, C. |
Title: | No need for governance? The impact of corporate governance on valuation, performance and survival of German banks during the 1870s |
Journal: | Business history
2009 : JUL, VOL. 51:4 p. 569-601 |
Index terms: | financial institutions standards law voting banks supervision shareholders |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | This paper describes the legal rules underlying corporate governance of banks in Germany during the 1870s as well as the rules of governance fixed in corporate charters collected from a sample of 202 charters for the year 1872. Governance standards were on average below the legal default. Particularly, voting rights as well as monitoring rights of shareholders were restricted. Most governance provisions did not influence on the level of Tobin's Q in 1872, the change of the market-to-book ratio during 1873, and the probability of firm survival until 1880. Yet large banks having adopted a one shareone vote provision and large banks having a governmental concession had a higher Tobin's Q, whereas the reverse holds for small banks. In addition, the probability of company survival was larger if small shareholders had voting rights or if shareholders could elect the supervisory board. |
SCIMA