search query: @author Veugelers, R. / total: 12
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| Author: | Veugelers, R. |
| Title: | Reputation as a mechanism alleviating opportunistic host government behavior against MNEs |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1993 : MAR, VOL. 41:1, p. 1-17 |
| Index terms: | INVESTMENT GOVERNMENT OPTIONS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The strategic options available to MNEs and host governments, when the first contemplate investment in the latter's country, are marked by the possibility that no entry eventually will take place as a response to opportunistic behavior on the part of the host government. This article examines under which circumstances and how in a dynamic world with asymmetric information, reputation building by the host government can credibly alleviate this opportunistic behavior, leaving a safer climate for MNE investment. |
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