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Author:Jacobsen, H.J.
Jensen, M.
Sloth, B.
Title:Evolutionary learning in signalling games
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
2001 : VOL.34:1, p. 34-63
Index terms:EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
LEARNING
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors have studied equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process they studied extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the so-called Riley equilibrium will be observed frequently.
SCIMA record nr: 221712
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