search query: @journal_id 788 / total: 123
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| Author: | Chakraborty, I. |
| Title: | Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's Curse |
| Journal: | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
2002 : WINTER, VOL. 11:4, p. 663-684 |
| Index terms: | BIDDING STRATEGY MODELS AUCTIONS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in a independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small. |
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