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Author:Fluet, C.
Garella, P. G.
Title:Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry
Journal:International Journal of Industrial Organization
2002 : SEP, VOL. 20:7, p. 907-930
Index terms:Advertising
Quality
Oligopoly
Language:eng
Abstract:The paper addresses the issue of whether firms use price or advertising to signal quality and whether advertising has pro- or anti-competitive effects. The authors show that, when there is price rivalry, advertising may be necessary may necessary to signal quality, in contrast to singel-firm models. Signaling through price alone prevails for sufficient inter-brand quality differentials; joint price-advertising signals prevail when the quality differential is small.
SCIMA record nr: 234699
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