search query: @author Haskel, J. / total: 13
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| Author: | Haskel, J. Sanchis, A. |
| Title: | Privatisation and X-inefficiency: a bargaining approach |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1995 : SEP, VOL. 43:3, p. 301-321 |
| Index terms: | BARGAINING PRIVATIZATION MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The usual analysis of privatisation and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model management effort. The authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity. Public sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximisers and therefore, compared to private sector firms, they bargain lower effort level since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart. |
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