search query: @author Rogalski, R. J. / total: 13
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| Author: | Lewis, C. M. Rogalski, R. J. Seward, J. K. |
| Title: | Agency problems, information asymmetries, and convertible debt security design. |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Intermediation
1998 : JAN, VOL. 7:1, p. 32-59 |
| Index terms: | DEBT MANAGEMENT AGENCIES BUSINESS INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The article proposes and implements a security design framework to assess why corporate managers issue convertible debt. The authors examine three theories that make predictions about the design of convertible debt. The results suggest that some issuers design convertible debt to mitigate asset substitution problems, while others design it to reduce adverse selection problems. The results indicate that corporate managers actively alter convertible debt security design to mitigate costly external finance problems. |
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