search query: @author Das, S. / total: 14
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| Author: | Das, S. |
| Title: | Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy |
| Journal: | Journal of International Economics
1997 : AUG, VOL. 43:1/2, p. 173-188 |
| Index terms: | TRADE POLICY ECONOMICS MANAGERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the implications of delegation of quantity or price setting power to the managers by the firm owners , for trade policy. Delegation reduces the scale of strategic trade policy in an exporting industry. In an import-competing oligopoly industry, the optimal tariff is less or greater than the standard optimal tariff depending on whether firms compete in quantity or price. A quantitative import restriction is collusive even when firms compete in quantities, and induces the home firm to become less sales-oriented and produce less. |
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