search query: @author Adams, M. / total: 14
reference: 8 / 14
| Author: | Adams, M. |
| Title: | Corporate Governance: Vertragen sich die deutsche Unternehmensverfassung und das Shareholder-Prinzip? |
| Journal: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1997 : ERGÄNZUNGSHEFT 4/97, p. 21-30 |
| Index terms: | SHAREHOLDER VALUE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BANKS INSURANCE COMPANIES CONTROL GERMANY |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | The big five private banks and the two Munich insurance companies dominate via proxy vote, bankowned shares and investment funds the biggest German firms in widespread ownership and some thousands other firms. The control over these controler lies by use of own investment funds, proxy votes and cross holdings within the controling group. The system of property and control works in the complete invers direction. Competition and efficiency of the German firms are heavily endangered by this type of control structure. This concentration of uncontroled power in the hands of a very small group of persons may become incompatible with a democratic system. It will be recommended to abolish proxy voting by banks without a direct order of the customer, to separate banks and investment funds, to forbid the use of maximum voting rights for public companies. |
SCIMA