search query: @indexterm fires / total: 14
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| Author: | Beetsma, R. Peters, H. Rebers, E. |
| Title: | When to fire bad managers: the role of collusion between management and board of directors |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
2000 : AUG, VOL. 42:4, p. 427-444 |
| Index terms: | Fires Managers Board of directors Mathematical models Corporate governance Shareholders |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Even among capitalist economies, there are pronounced differences in the way corporations are run. In many countries the ultimate power rests with the shareholders, who always have possibility to fire the management. The Anglo-Saxon system is therefore often cited as an example of how corporate governance should be organized in countries where shareholders have much less influence on the way the company is run. There the management and the BoD may protect each other at the expense of the sharefolder. Such collusion between management and directors is not always bad for shareholders. |
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