search query: @author Tehranian, H. / total: 14
reference: 3 / 14
| Author: | Booth, J. R. Cornett, M. M. Tehranian, H. |
| Title: | Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation |
| Journal: | Journal of Banking and Finance
2002 : OCT, VOL. 26:10, p. 1973-1996 |
| Index terms: | Commercial banks Board of directors Regulations Agencies |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine whether regulation can be used to substitute for internal monitoring mechanisms to control for agency conflicts in a firm. They find that, in general, the percentage of outside directors is negatively related to insider stock ownership, but is not affected by CEO/Chair duality. CEO/Chair duality is, however, less likely when insider stock ownership increases. The authors conclude that to the extent that regulations reduce the impact of managerial decisions on shareholder wealth, effective internal monitoring of managers becomes less important in controlling agency conflicts. |
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