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| Author: | Schmid, H. B. |
| Title: | Rationality-in-Relations |
| Journal: | American Journal of Economics and Sociology
2003 : JAN, VOL. 62:1, p. 67-104 |
| Index terms: | SOCIAL SCIENCES EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS THEORIES RATIONALITY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | If in a game with multiple proper coordination equilibria there is a single one that is best for all participants, it rational for each participant to choose the strategy that has the best equilibrium as one of its possible outcomes. This seems so obvious that any plausible theory of rationality should be expected to be applicable to such situations. However, this is not true for the "orthodox" theory of rational choice, as Robert Sugden has convincingly shown. In this paper, the author will argue that this failure is due to an implicit individualistic understanding of intentionality. The account the author shall develop differs from Searle's own, as for reasons to be found in his overall project, Searle's departure from the orthodox view of rationality gets stuck half-way. |
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