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| Author: | Johansson, I. |
| Title: | Searle's Monadological Construction of Social Reality |
| Journal: | American Journal of Economics and Sociology
2003 : JAN, VOL. 62:1, p. 233-256 |
| Index terms: | SOCIAL SCIENCES THEORIES ANALYTICAL REVIEW |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | One aim of this paper is to make visible the connection between Searle's views on social reality and his general ontology, and at the same time to show that some peculiar features of his analysis of social reality are a natural outcome of his general ontology. The paper contains five sections. In the first Searle's naturalism is philosophicall situated and its differentia specified explained. Then, Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is presented. One might say that, according to Searle, each mind is, although caused by a material brain, a Leibnizian monad. This view is related to an important, but neglected, distinction that Searle himself has made between requirement conditions of satisfaction and required conditions of satisfaction. |
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