search query: @indexterm rationality / total: 141
reference: 100 / 141
| Author: | Volij, O. |
| Title: | Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1996 : AUG, VOL. 70:2, p. 391-406 |
| Index terms: | EQUILIBRIUM THEORY GAME THEORY RATIONALITY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Aumann and Brandenburger (Econometrica 63 1995, p. 1161-1180) provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of non-expected utility preferences. |
SCIMA