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Author:Costa-Gomes, M.
Zauner, K. G.
Title:Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
2001 : FEB, VOL. 34:2, p. 238-269
Index terms:BARGAINING
ISRAEL
JAPAN
SLOVENIA
USA
SOCIETY
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors explain the main features of the results of the four-country ultimatum bargaining experiments of Roth (et al. (1991), Amer. Econom. Rev. 81, 1068-1095) by a social utility model. The specification of social utility of a player has two parts: a linear combination of the monetary payoffs of the proposer and the responder and payoff uncertainty. The authors find that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries. Proposers have negative regard for responders' monetary earnings in countries where responders have high negative regard for proposers' earnings (USA and Slovenia). In countries where responders have low negative regard for proposers' earnings (Israel and Japan), proposers are expected payoff maximizers.
SCIMA record nr: 224844
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