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Author:Maskin, E.
Title:Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality
Journal:Review of Economic Studies
1999 : JAN, VOL. 66:1(226), p. 23-38
Index terms:ECONOMICS
EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
WELFARE
Language:eng
Abstract:If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of "welfare optima". A game form (or "mechanism") implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form and (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal.
SCIMA record nr: 199308
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