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| Author: | Meza, D. de Southey, C. |
| Title: | Too much monitoring, not enough performance pay |
| Journal: | Economic Journal
1999 : MAR, VOL. 109:454, p. C126-C139 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMICS PAY SELF-EMPLOYMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper endogenises the internal organization of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework. The options are monitored teams, unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay, and self-employment. The choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output. As more people opt for self employment, pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and Pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise. |
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