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| Author: | Harvey, K. D. Shrieves, R. E. |
| Title: | Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Research
2001 : WINTER, VOL. 24:4, p. 495-512 |
| Index terms: | EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION PAY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Using data that reflect the significant growth in incentive compensation during the last decade, the authors extend research in this area by specifying a more complete model that addresses both corporate governance and risk-sharing factors that theory suggests should influence compensation policy. The authors find that the extent of incentive compensation is systematically related to other features of corporate governance, as well as to factors affecting managerial risk aversion. The results support the following conclusions: (a) the presence of outside directors and blockholders facilitates the use of incentive compensation, (b) incentive compensation is inversely related to use of leverage, and (c) the incentive pay component of compensation is lower for CEOs near or at retirement age. |
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