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| Author: | Beissinger, T. Egger, H. |
| Title: | Dynamic wage bargaining if benefits are tied to individual wages |
| Journal: | Oxford Economic Papers
2004 : JUL, VOL. 56:3, p. 437-460 |
| Index terms: | Collective bargaining Unemployment Pay Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In most countries unemployment (hereafter as: unempl.) benefits (here as: bens.) are tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. It is shown how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account. The findings are compared for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unempl. compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unempl. bens. system. It is also demonstrated that a reduction of unempl. bens. of those becoming unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment. |
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