search query: @freeterm lobbying / total: 16
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| Author: | Epstein, G.S. Nitzan, S. |
| Title: | Strategic restraint in contests |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
2004 : FEB, VOL. 48:1, p. 201-210 |
| Index terms: | Strategy Policy Models |
| Freeterms: | Lobbying Polarization |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game btw. two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. This paper extends such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. The main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. |
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