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Author:Goyal, S.
Janssen, M.
Title:Dynamic coordination failures and the efficiency of the firm
Journal:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1995 : OCT, VOL. 28:2, p. 223-240
Index terms:GAMES
SIGNALING
PAY INCENTIVES
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is also examined. In particular, the authors show that Cournot competition may increase the inefficiency of organizational practices. In many organizations activities of different employees have to be geared to one another.
SCIMA record nr: 141609
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