search query: @indexterm PAY INCENTIVES / total: 165
reference: 20 / 165
| Author: | Sherstyuk, K. |
| Title: | Performance standards and incentive pay in agency contracts |
| Journal: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2000 : VOL. 102:4, p. 725-736 |
| Index terms: | AGENCY THEORY PAY INCENTIVES PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. The authors show that under the optimal contract in this case, the principal sets a performance standard and punishes the agent if the standard is not met, but rewards the agent on a profit-sharing basis if the standard is significantly exceeded. |
SCIMA