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| Author: | Waller, W. S. |
| Title: | Slack in participative budgeting : the joint effect of a truth-inducing pay scheme and risk preferences. (!Employee Information) |
| Journal: | Accounting, Organizations and Society
1988 : VOL. 13:1, p. 87-98 |
| Index terms: | PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT BUDGETING PAY INCENTIVES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | An incentive problem in participative budgeting occurs when worker has private information about the factors that influence his or her performance and the pay scheme is budget or standard-based. This information, if communicated accurately by the worker, may be valuable to a manager for planning and control purposes.However, the worker has an incentive to bias its communication. To alleviate this problem truth-inducing pay schemes are proposed, that provide incentive for accurately communicating private information and maximizing performance. |
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