search query: @author Wirl, F. / total: 17
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| Author: | Wirl, F. |
| Title: | The design of optimal conservation programs by electric utilities considering strategic consumer behavior |
| Journal: | Management Science
1996 : MAR, VOL. 42:3, p. 404-414 |
| Index terms: | MANAGEMENT MORAL HAZARD DEMAND |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The practice of utility demand side conservation programs, one of the most topical issues of utility management, provokes strategic reactions of consumers. As a solution to this moral hazard, optimal conservation programs are characterized when the consumers differ either with respect to their subjective time preference or with respect to the level of demand. In particular, the author derives incentive compatible conservation schemes that mitigate strategic behavior. These incentives differ starkly from actual programs. |
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