search query: @author Slemrod, J. / total: 17
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| Author: | Crocker, K.J. Slemrod, J. |
| Title: | Corporate tax evasion with agency costs |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2005 : SEP, VOL 89:9-10, p. 1593-1610 |
| Index terms: | Taxation Tax evasion Costs Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper examines corporate tax evasion (here as: t-evn.) in the context of the contractual relationship btw. the shareholders (here as: s-holders.) of a firm and a tax manager (here as: t-mgr). Using a costly state falsification framework, the paper characterizes formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the t-mgr. and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjust to offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegal t-evn., and a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result is found: penalties imposed on the t-mgr. are more effective in reducing t-evn. than are those imposed on s-holders. |
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