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Author:Slemrod, J.
Wilson, J.D.
Title:Tax competition with parasitic tax havens
Journal:Journal of Public Economics
2009 : DEC, VOL. 93:11-12, p. 1261-1270
Index terms:taxation
tax havens
competition
Freeterms:compliance costs
Language:eng
Abstract:This study develops a tax competition framework with some jurisdictions, called tax havens, being parasitic on the revenues of other countries. These countries use resources aiming to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. It is shown that the full/partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. It is also demonstrated that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens. It is shown that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. It is argued that these results extend to the case with also taxes on wage income involving administrative and compliance costs.
SCIMA record nr: 274716
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