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Author:Tian, G.
Title:Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
Journal:Economic Theory
1999 : VOL. 13:3, p. 689-708
Index terms:IMPLEMENTATION
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
PRODUCTION
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper considers double Walrasian allocations and Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition patterns are all unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanisms presented here are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, the authors' mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies.
SCIMA record nr: 199059
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