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| Author: | Peters, M. Severinov, S. |
| Title: | Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1997 : JUL, VOL. 75:1, p. 141-179 |
| Index terms: | MARKETS COMPETITION SELLING AUCTIONS PRICES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article studies a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions instead of simple fixed price contracts. The studied model has two variants: one extends the model of MacAfee (1993) in which buyers know they valuations before they choose among auctions available; the other variant extends a model by Wolinsky (1988) in which buyers learn their valuations after meeting sellers. The article characterizes the equilibrium array of auctions for each case and analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibria. |
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