search query: @author Gomez-Mejia, L. R. / total: 18
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| Author: | Gomez-Mejia, L. R. Tosi, H. Hinkin, T. |
| Title: | Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. |
| Journal: | Academy of Management Journal
1987 : MAR, VOL. 30:1, p. 51-70 |
| Index terms: | MANAGEMENT CONTROL EXECUTIVES COMPANY PERFORMANCE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Using a sample of 7l very large manufactures, it is demonstrated, that executives in externally controlled firms receive more compensation for performance and less for scale of operation than their counterparts in firms without dominant stockholders. The main conclusion is that outside dominant stockholders view firms primarily as investments and have the power and the incentive to align the compensation of hired chief executive officers with performance of firms. |
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