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| Author: | Marino, A.M. |
| Title: | Merger, ease of entry and entry deterrence in a dynamic model |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2006 : SEP, VOL. 54:3, p. 397-423 |
| Index terms: | dynamic models entry conditions mergers |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes whether case and speed of entry can mitigate the anti-competitive effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In the model, if new companies can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. Nevertheless, if entry of new companies becomes less costly, companies may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. |
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