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| Author: | Bhagat, S. Jefferis, R. H. |
| Title: | Voting power in the proxy process. The case of antitakeover charter amendments |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1991 : NOV, VOL.30:1, p.193-225 |
| Index terms: | MERGERS SHARE INCENTIVE SCHEMES VOTING POWER BIAS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The likelihood that a firm will enact a management-sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure. This implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated. Then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects. An estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth. The voting power of employee stock ownership plans and the chief executive officer plays a prominent role in determining whether a firm will adopt this type of takeover defense. |
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