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| Author: | Buchholz, W. Haupt, A. Peters, W. |
| Title: | International environmental agreements and strategic voting |
| Journal: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2005 : VOL 107:1, p. 175-195 |
| Index terms: | Environmental policy International Contracts Voting Pollution control Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement with the governments (hereafter as: gov./govs.) elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of "global" pollution, the elected politicians (here as: polcs.) pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if govs. cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively, the elected polcs. can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining. |
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