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Author:Gilli, M.
Title:On non-Nash equilibria
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
1999 : MAY, VOL. 27:2, p. 184-203
Index terms:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
Language:eng
Abstract:The author considers generalizations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the players' beliefs should not be contradicted, even if they could possibly be incorrect. This possibility depend on the information about opponents' behaviour available to the players in equilibrium. Therefore the players' information is crucial for this notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium in general and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (Rubinsten-Wolinsky 1994) when the game and the players' Bayesian rationality are common knowledge.
SCIMA record nr: 192781
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