search query: @indexterm Economic behaviour / total: 184
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Author:Sherstuyk, K.
Title:Team selection with asymmetric agents
Journal:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1999 : APR, VOL. 38:4, p. 421-452
Index terms:ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
ORGANIZATION
TEAM WORK
Language:eng
Abstract:In shallow markets where there are mutual gains from cooperation among agents, collusive behavior may occur even if it does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Yet, such behavior is rarely sustainable. Bolle (1994) reports the results of one-period team selection experiments in which subject often did not follow the Nash equilibrium behavior but engaged in tact collusion. The author finds that collusion is not sustainable and the outcomes converge to levels close to the Nash equilibrium.
SCIMA record nr: 199024
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